Veluppillai v Chief Land Registrar and Others [2017] EWHC 1693 (Fam)


  • W petitioned for divorce three times. On the first two occasions, H persuaded her to withdraw her petition.
  • Financial remedy proceedings were initiated and resulted in an order by Mostyn J dated 29 October 2015 (the “2015 Order”). The 2015 Order required the transfer of a property between H to W. The property was held in H’s sole name and it was subject to a mortgage in favour of the Bank of Scotland plc. A restriction was placed on the Register in relation to the property.
  • H assaulted W and W’s counsel in court during the financial remedy proceedings and he had been convicted of assault as a result.
  • Mostyn J granted an extended civil restraint order against H, with a term of two years.
  • H subsequently issued claims for compensation against the Bank of Scotland and the Chief Land Registrar, claiming that the order in the financial remedy proceedings had been brought about as a result of identity fraud, and that he had never been married to W and/or been a party to the financial remedies proceedings.
  • The Chief Land Registrar and the Bank applied to strike out the applications, and for a general civil restraint order to be made against H.



  • The claims were struck out; a general civil restraint order was made against H.
  • H’s claims against the Bank were nullities, having been made without the required permission from the judge identified in the extended civil restraint order. They were dismissed automatically.
  • In addition the claims were manifestly abusive because they amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on the 2015 Order, which was based on the valid marriage of H and W.
  • The extended civil restraint order had not been sufficient because it simply had not worked. It was accordingly appropriate to make a general civil restraint order.
  • The order would last for two years. There was a strong case for the order being made indefinitely. Because of the two-year limit imposed by paragraph 4.9(1) of PD 3C of the Family Procedure Rules, however, the judge thought that it would not be a proper exercise of his power to make such order pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction.